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Břetislav Dančák/Vít Hlouek (Brünn)
The Concept of Leadership in Central
Europe:
Discussing the Austrian and Polish Cases1
Der Artikel analysiert in komparativer Perspektive österreichische und polnische Außenpolitik in Bezug
auf Mitteleuropa. Mitteleuropa wird hier als ein Kern dargestellt, bestehend aus Österreich, der Visegrad-
Gruppe, Slowenien und potenziell auch Kroatien. Der Artikel wird eingeleitet mit einer kurzen Beschreibung
der Entwicklung von Aussagen und Prioritäten der österreichischen und polnischen mitteleuropäischen
Außenpolitik von 1989 bis heute. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt dabei den letzten Jahren. Obwohl
Österreich und Polen verschiedene Typen von Ländern darstellen, haben (oder hatten) beide eine
Führungsposition in Mitteleuropa angestrebt. In den letzten 15 Jahren haben beide Staaten wiederholt
versucht, diese Rolle einzunehmen. Die Autoren sind der Ansicht, dass die österreichischen Ambitionen,
eine solche Rolle zu spielen, aus der EU-Mitgliedschaft Österreichs hervorgeht. Anderseits sieht sich
Polen als regionale Führungskraft, dessen Position auf dem offensichtlichen Beitrag Polens zur
europäischen Sicherheit und Stabilität beruht. In anderen mitteleuropäischen Ländern werden keine
ähnlichen Leadership-Tendenzen beobachtet. Im Vordergrund steht die Analyse dieser Themen im Kontext
des diplomatischen und politischen Umfelds der mitteleuropäischen Länder. Ebenso werden die
Perspektiven der EU und der NATO zur Diskussion gestellt. Der Beitrag endet mit einer vergleichenden
Erwägung einer möglichen Führungsrolle Österreichs bzw. Polens im mitteleuropäischen Kontext.
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1. Central Europe as a research
framework
May 1st 2004 remains a crucial event not only
to the EU but also to the countries of Central
Europe. Entering the EU reformed the potential
framework of Central European space. The
former level of cooperation created by the
Visegrád Group could be expanded to a broader
range of countries including Austria and
Slovenia. Reassessment of the notion of Cen-
tral Europe opens question of leadership of
mutual cooperation in a variety of fields. This
paper aims at evaluating the leadership possi-
bilities of both of the natural leaders of the
Central European area  Austria and Poland.
It is almost traditional that when dealing with
the notion of Central Europe, it is impossible to
escape the definition of Central European. The
agenda of Central Europe has been latently ex-
amined since the middle of the 19th century (cf.
Miller 1999) and was revitalized during the sec-
ond half of the 1980s when the concept of Cen-
tral Europe replaced the notion of East Cen-
tral (or sometimes even Eastern) Europe pre-
vailing in Western political and scientific dis-
course till that time. We believe that methodo-
logical separation of a specific Central Euro-
pean region outside Eastern and Western Eu-
rope is fruitful and fully justified (cf. Halecki
2000; Halecki 1962; Szücs 1990; Berend/Ránki
1974; Wandycz 1992).
A clear opportunity emerged after the last
wave of EU enlargement, that the concept of
Central Europe would be able to cross over un-
natural boundaries established in the period of
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the Cold War. Thus we assume in this context
that a working conceptualization of Central
Europe could be as follows and could incorpo-
rate Austria, countries of the Visegrád group and
Slovenia. There is a perspective that even
Croatia could be a partner in the broader per-
spective of progress in the Croatian EU acces-
sion process. Such a conceptualization is not
only a traditional or geopolitical one but one
which pays respect to the mutual approaches of
concerned countries and nations towards each
other just as well as towards other European
regions. The termination of division of Europe
by the Iron Curtain could provoke certain
progress of Central European cooperation. We
can presuppose that such cooperation will be
provided more on the basis of similar interest
than on a common historical experience and
shared historical identity (Béhar 1994; Le Rider
1994). The similarity of regional interests of
Central European countries could build a new
quality within the complex framework of
multilevel governance structures of the EU, but
we assume that the quality of the enlarged EU
should be evaluated already. A more precise
conceptualization and assessment of the Cen-
tral European dimension of the EU multilevel
governance system could be provided after a
careful examination of recent evidence. The first
opportunity for adequate research could be an
analysis of the Austrian presidency of the EU
in the context of regional aspirations and poli-
cies of Central European countries.
2. The concept of leadership  how to
understand it in Central European
terms?
Central Europe changed its status radically
after the end of the Cold War. In this area, there
was probably the most significantly visible dis-
solution of the bipolar world. The creation of
new relationships in the Central European re-
gion has been accompanied by two parallel proc-
esses. One has an external and the other an in-
ternal nature.
The fundamental external factors with in-
dubitable impact on the arrangement in Central
Europe were geopolitical interests of big Euro-
pean and also non-European players, namely the
US, Russia, Germany, and France.
In the category of internal factors are counted
concepts of arrangements which followed di-
rectly from Central European states. On the one
hand, these factors were connected with the pri-
orities of Central European countries in foreign
policies. On the other hand, these factors also
depended on their abilities to enforce a certain
vision of arrangement.
The dimension of changes in the regional
framework gave a relatively huge space for the
exercise of different ideas, although not all coun-
tries had the same ambitions to realize their vi-
sions of a future Central European arrangement.
In the next part of the paper, the leadership
phenomenon will be elaborated, which is con-
nected with the transformation of the interna-
tional environment in a Central European frame-
work.
Evaluation of leadership in Central Europe
could be carried out through several approaches
to international politics. Because of the re-
maining importance of national states as key
actors in the process of creating the Central
European arrangement, the authors decided to
use realism (Hobson 2000; Holsti 1995) as a
suitable approach to explain international rela-
tions in Central Europe after 1989. Several se-
rious disputes between countries in the region
back up the claim for realism. Examples such
as the Austrian-Czech debate over the nuclear
power plant Temelín, the Hungarian-Slovak
controversy over a Danube dam in Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros, and the Polish-Russian rift over
the military status of Kaliningrad clearly show
that national interests are still leading moti-
vations for states behavior in international poli-
tics.2
So, what is the definition of leadership?
What are the preconditions for claiming that
some country is in a leadership position?
Generally speaking, notions of leadership,
or concepts of leadership are frequently used in
texts dealing with company management and
organizational structures (Bolman/Deal 2003;
Ehrenberg 2004; Rothwell 2005). Leadership in
international relations is much more fluent, but
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the notion is also used very often. For common
observers it is obvious that for instance the U.S.
is a declared leader in the global international
order (Brzezinski 2004; Kagan 2003; Nye
2003). Another example from European soil,
France and Germany have been described as
leading nations in the European integration proc-
ess (Dyson/Featherstone 1999, 71ff.; Dyson
2000, 174ff.). Many other examples could be
named, but there is still a lack of a simple, un-
questionable definition of leadership in inter-
national relations. Because of that lack, we have
tried to elaborate and adjusted another concept,
which is designed for international relations and
could link crucial aspects of leadership used in
this text. For that purpose the superpower con-
cept described by Ken Aldred and Martin A.
Smith is very useful. Their evaluation concerns
the U.S. position in the world. From that point
of view, certain modifications have to be made
with regard to leadership in the Central Euro-
pean region.
What kind of arguments support the claim
of superpower and could serve also for a lead-
ership concept? William T. R. Fox argues that
... in making an international superpower was
more just a countrys possession of the attributes
of power: military, economic, political and ideo-
logical. A superpower was principally distin-
guished by dynamism and pro-activity, by the
ability and willingness to project power and
influence. Superpower status, in other words,
was gained not just by what a country had but
by what it did, or was prepared to do (Fox
1944, 21; Aldred/Smith 1999, 1819; emph.
added). From that point of view, there are at least
three essential prerequisites which must be ful-
filled if a country is to assume a leadership po-
sition:
1. A country has to have potential for leader-
ship;
2. A country has to have ambition and will to
act as leader;
3. A country has to strive for achieving legiti-
macy of its leadership position.
Ad 1) A countrys potential usually results from
the fact that some parameters are objectively
given such as territory size, number of
population, geographical location. But, eco-
nomic power, military capacity, and mem-
bership in key international organizations are
also significantly important  this is con-
nected with political influence.
Ad 2) Nevertheless, only having huge potential
is not sufficient guarantee that a country will
be perceived by others as a leader. There is
the necessity to have ambitions and aspira-
tions to achieve leadership status. In the short
term, the country has to be prepared to use
its potential and promote itself with a very
active approach on the international scene.
Ad 3) A real leader can only be a country which
is perceived as such by others. The rest of
the international players should have reasons
as to why they should accept this leadership
position. For long-term leadership it is nec-
essary to deal with legitimacy. Without le-
gitimacy derived from the international com-
munity, it is very difficult for a leader to keep
its exceptional position. According to
Samuel Huntington a leading or superpower
position also derives from a countrys abil-
ity to promote an ideal with appeal beyond
its borders (cf. Aldred/Smith 1999, 168ff.).
Analysis of political development in the Cen-
tral European area shows us that during the last
fifteen years there have been examples of two
countries which have tried to emerge as certain
kinds of leaders, namely Austria and Poland.
An evaluation of motivations and successes or
failings of their efforts will be a matter for the
following section.
3. Austria  hesitating candidate for
leadership role in Central Europe
Austrian foreign policy orientation can be
subsumed to three main given conditions:
 Tradition of foreign policy interests and ac-
tivities both towards the Western and the
Eastern part of European continent;
 Austrian position within the EU limited in
the relations towards new member countries
and candidate countries by domestic politi-
cal, social, and economic interests;
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 Strict policy of neutrality in security and
foreign policy issues; active support of mul-
tilateral security structures (OSCE) and EU
tools (CFSP, ESDP).
In spite of the isolation which was created
between Austria and other Central European
States during the Cold War period, Austrian
foreign policy tried to play an active role to-
wards these states whose frontiers were given
by State Treaty (1955), while at the same time
adopting a neutral position within the general
configuration of a bipolar Europe, sharply di-
vided by the Iron Curtain. Some proposals from
the Central European confederation emerged
shortly after Word War Two but they were
quickly obscured and disregarded by other prob-
lems in a divided Central Europe (cf. Marjanović
1998, 77ff.). Austria however remained a very
active player in Central Europe.
The first international community in Cen-
tral Europe not paying respect to a bipolar world
was founded in 1978. It was the Working Com-
munity Alps-Adriatic which continued the ac-
tivities of a smaller circle and coupled together
Austria, Italy, the former Yugoslavian federa-
tion, and later Hungary.
The idea of Central European cooperation
was discussed broadly in Austria in the 1980s.
Concerning the political reality, these discus-
sions were not able to cross over the academic
or literal debates and concepts. Both the SPÖ
and ÖVP took an active part in this process but
the latter developed a series of projects designed
for strengthening cooperation in Central Europe
and the Danube macro-region. Interestingly,
Austria was not willing to create and maintain
special relations with Central European coun-
tries after 1989. Moreover, there was a clear ten-
dency to create clear border-lines between Aus-
tria and Central Europe.
Austria oriented itself more towards the
European Community and the general public
in Austria started to think about Central Euro-
pean countries more in terms of economic ri-
valry and potential danger (cf. Marjanović
1998, 126 ff.). The enthusiasm of the early
1990s connected with efforts to help the states
of Central Europe politically and economically
diminished fast (Khol 1990, 826ff.; Bischof/
Pelinka 1992).
If we compare real outcomes and impor-
tance, we have to say that more effective than
classical interstate bilateral contacts were clearly
designed projects of regional cooperation which
comprehended questions of transit transporta-
tion, ecological issues, or cultural contacts.
There was a novelized issue of Federal consti-
tutional law entering into force on 1st January
1989 which allowed federal regions (Länder)
to negotiate and sign international cooperation
treaties with neighboring countries without ne-
cessity of confirmation by federal agencies. This
amendment led indirectly to new activities in
the framework of the Working Community
Alps-Adriatic. This former regional initiative
was restructured at the level of states in 1989.
Agreement institutionalizing regional coopera-
tion was signed on 12th November 1989 and
the new organization was labeled as the Initia-
tive of Four or Quadragonale. This institution
then increased the number of member states
step-by-step, and finally transformed itself into
the Central European Initiative (CEI).
Another cooperative body was created with
the founding of the Working Community of the
Danubian Countries (Arbeitsgemeinschaft
Donauländer, ARGE) which was constituted in
1990. ARGE Donauländer also tries to cooper-
ate intensively with CEI and it concentrates its
effort on projects that use instruments of the EU
regional policy. The Working Community is
however stuck on regional and sector-limited
cooperation and its territorial scope goes far
beyond Central Europe, we can evaluate it as
an example of the active Austrian approach to
regional cooperation and agenda setting proc-
esses.
Austria also took an active part in the proc-
ess of the establishment of the political initia-
tive Danube Cooperation Process whose aim
was the recovery of the Danube zone damaged
by the U.S.-led military intervention in Serbia.
Austria was one of the countries presenting this
idea in September 2001.
The last important Austrian initiative aimed
at strengthening mutual relations in Central
Europe was the meeting between Austria and
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five of the then EU candidate countries (the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia) in Vienna in June 2001. The aim of
this encounter was to create an informal regional
partnership among the states concerned. Aus-
trian diplomacy prospected possibilities of
broader cooperation with countries that were
meant to be in the next wave of the EU enlarge-
ment and that would probably have many com-
mon interests in the EU framework. A more or
less hidden goal of the Austrian initiative thus
was to identify shared interests and to find out
effective means of their representation. The
notion of cultural cooperation was discussed too.
Although meetings of this vague forum com-
posed of foreign ministers continued in the fol-
lowing years (for example in November 2001
in Bratislava or in July 2003 in Buchlovice), we
can not assume that this partnership is working
as a bold element in the forming of mutual poli-
cies of Central European states nor is it the key
factor of Central European countries coopera-
tion in the EU. Regional partnership however
remains important factor of Austrian foreign
policy in Central Europe (Ferrero-Waldner
2004; Plassnik 2005). Another important factor
of Austrian foreign policy in Central Europe is
intensive and broad cultural diplomacy such
as platform Culture  Central Europe.
3.1. Austria and NATO  the limit for Austrian
security leadership potential
The Austrian chancellor Wolfgang
Schüssel´s first cabinet tried to foster coopera-
tion with Austria at the international security
field level by ties with NATO, notably by en-
gaging Austria in the Partnership for Peace Pro-
gram (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council. Austria welcomed the enlargement of
NATO at the Prague summit although it is not a
member of the Alliance. NATOs enlargement
was seen as an extension of the zone of peace
and stability in Central and South-Eastern Eu-
rope. Attempts to strengthen the relationship
with NATO including the possibility of a full-
fledged membership were abandoned in
Schüssel´s second term given the strict rejec-
tion by the Austrian public and the opposition
parties. Thus the prospect of abandoning neu-
trality is very small at least in the short term
(Hummer 2000, 221ff.). Austrian not-being in
NATO limits Austrian leadership potential in the
security field because most other Central Euro-
pean countries (especially Poland) are design-
ing their security policies more in accordance
with NATO than with instruments of the EU.
3.2. Austria in the European Union
Despite of some controversies connected to
Austrian neutrality (Neuhoff 1995), Austria
became a full member of the European Union
by 1st January 1995, just forty years after re-
gaining its national sovereignty. It was a mutu-
ally beneficial deal for both sides because Aus-
tria is one of the richest countries and thus a net
payer to the EU budget. Austria met the EUs
convergence criteria without problems and has
become one of eleven countries that have intro-
duced the Euro since 1999.
Another important challenge for Austria was
the question of further enlargement of the EU.
Austria was the neighbor of four candidate coun-
tries; important Austrian economic centers are
near the borderlines with these countries which
meant there was potential concurrence in the
environment according to the framework of the
single market of the EU. Some of the new mem-
ber countries have unsolved questions derived
from the past. Austria is facing the problem of
Central European nuclear plants too. All these
and related issues were a dramatic part of pre-
accession negotiations with candidate countries
because Austria naturally tried to express its
point of view in a broader diplomatic context.
However, if we evaluate the outcome of EU
enlargement from a broader time perspective,
we can clearly see that Austria will profit from
this process (Petsche/Hinteregger 2001). It can
be shown in terms of economic opportunities
offered by new markets in which Austrian firms
are already well established. Another advantage
for Austria is in political potential that is em-
bodied by Central European countries in terms
of strengthening external security by reshuffling
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EU borders farther to the East. And it could be
just a Central European dimension of an en-
larged EU that could help Austria to expand its
voice in the framework of the EU if it were able
to create a feeling of joint interests in the Cen-
tral European region, whether in the position of
leader or not.
The first hard test of potential Central Euro-
pean coherence however almost failed. It was
connected to the difficult creation of Schüssel´s
first coalition government at the beginning of
the year 2000. The so-called sanctions against
Austria by the EU-14 also showed deep divi-
sion of policies towards Austria provided by
different Central European states (Böhm/
Lahodynsky 2001; Mayr-Harting 2001; Olt
2001; Feldner 2000).
One of the negative outcomes of this situa-
tion was a dramatic decline of Austrian public
support of the EU, disappointment of the Aus-
trian political elite caused by steps made by other
member countries and last but not least also dis-
appointment from positions adopted by several
candidate states (we recall that the Czech Re-
public fully supported the EU-14, in contrast to
the more balanced view of Hungary). A posi-
tive outcome could be found in the fact that
Austria was once again forced to collect diplo-
matic support from EU member and candidate
countries and thus became more engaged in
Central European affairs.
How should the present activities of Austria
in the EU be evaluated? Previous activity of
Austria in the EU indicates that Austria is still
searching for its role within the Union. There
are several reasons that support this statement.
Austria can still be regarded a young mem-
ber of the club, the Austria-EU crisis in 2000
also caused difficulties for the Austrian role-
defining process and in the outcome it weak-
ened the Austrian position which was clearly
seen when Austria tried without success to link
the accession talks with the Czech Republic with
the so-called Bene decrees and the Czech nu-
clear plant Temelín. On the other hand, we can
say, that Austria was not damaged by sanc-
tions and Austrian diplomacy proved its ability
to get at least some support from candidate coun-
tries of Central Europe.
It could be concluded that Austrian EU-
membership has a positive impact on the Aus-
trian economy (Breuss 2003; Joint Report 2000,
19) thus improving its economic position in
Central Europe.3  In political terms, Austria is
far less successful due to some hard to solve
problems with its neighbors. The sanctions
clearly showed limits of support provided to
Austria by other countries of Central Europe.
Recent evidence shows however a strong po-
tential of improvement of bilateral relations of
Austria to other Central European countries in
the context of European integration. For in-
stance, problems concerning the nuclear power
plant Temelín were eased decisively by the so-
called Melk Process (Conclusions 2001).4
Some other EU policies issues could how-
ever make a gap between the Austrian position
and political priorities of other Central Euro-
pean EU-members. A specific problem is the
question of protection of the Austrian labor
market provided by seven years of restrictions
on the free movement of persons.
The further Eastern enlargement of the EU
could have a positive impact, which could lead
to a more convergent position of Austria and
other Central European countries vis-à-vis new
member countries. The geopolitical position of
Austria connecting East and West of the EU
could be strengthened again.
3.3. Austria and its leadership potential 
other aspects and evaluation
What conditions are given to Austria follow-
ing the above mentioned concept of leadership?
First of all, Austria has a very favorable posi-
tion both in geopolitical and geo-economic
terms. Austria is a transit country for important
European transport routes and its position con-
necting Western and Central Europe is from a
geopolitical point of view almost ideal. Austrian
economic capacities are also relatively highly
developed and Austria plays an important role
in Central European foreign trade and belongs
to the group of most important foreign inves-
tors for new EU member countries. Austria plays
an active role in many international organiza-
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tions. Austria is active above all in questions
concerning international development and re-
lief. Vienna is the seat of many international
organizations (UN, OSCE, OPEC, several im-
portant NGOs). Assuming Austrian leadership
potential we can conclude that Austria has a
certain capacity to play the role of Central Eu-
ropean leader, most of all in economic (Kastner
2001) and cultural terms.
However, the leadership potential is not suf-
ficient. Equally important is the willingness of
an actor to play the role of (regional) leader.
Looking back at the previous fifteen years, we
can observe on some occasions that Austria tried
to play a leading role in Central Europe by pre-
senting new projects and initiating broader co-
operation (e.g. ARGE). Certain problems were
created by the scope of cooperation. Too many
countries were involved and were too limited
in the development of their shared aims at the
same time. Austrias most serious attempt was
made in unfavorable circumstances shortly af-
ter the Austrian coalition crisis and European
sanctions.
This leads us to the final condition of lead-
ership. No country should become a regional
leader without a certain level of recognition by
its neighboring countries that would have to
accept its leadership. This is a crucial point in
the explanation of why Austrian ambitions are
so far unfulfilled. Austria has simply too many
unresolved issues with some of its neighboring
countries that limit the possibility of a broad
acceptance of Austrian leadership. Another
problem is a certain unwillingness and unpre-
paredness of Central European countries to cre-
ate a tighter international partnership, although
it may help strongly to define and defend com-
mon interests.
The example of the Czech Republic high-
lights another problem which is an obstacle to
Central European cooperation. Czech politics
is divided somehow between the economic
gravitational power of Germany, and security
affiliation to U.S.-dominated security structures
(although the Czech political elite are divided
on this issue). Without reasonable and accept-
able concepts of cooperation suitable for a com-
plex Central European environment, Austria
would hardly be able to compete with the natu-
ral strength of Germany or the U.S.
Thus, Austria shows certain elements of
leadership ambitions but they are not always
based in clear Central European territorial set-
tings and they are very often directed towards
cross-regional patterns of cooperation more than
interstates ones. Austria is using its leadership
potential in Central Europe only in a limited way
and it shows that Austrian foreign policy di-
rected towards the Central European region is
very often not so ambitious to deliberately strive
for the key role of regional leader. A certain
lack of will creates a firm obstacle for the
Austrian leadership position.
4. Poland  an ambitious player in Central
European affairs
Poland was in the leading position in Cen-
tral Europe thanks to the fact that it was the first
country within the so-called Eastern Block
where political changes started in 1989. Polish
events were an inspiration and example for oth-
ers to follow. Shortly after the countrys regain-
ing of sovereignty, the main foreign policy pri-
orities were formulated. There are three stable
and dominant spheres of Polish interests in for-
eign policy:
1. Relations with neighbors and Central-Euro-
pean co-operation;
2. Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the European Union;
3. Relationships with the Russian Federation
and post-Soviet countries.
Each of the above mentioned categories have
a set of subcategories and they can be compared
by their importance. For instance under the
agenda of relationships with neighbors belong
bilateral relations with Germany but also rela-
tions within the EU and NATO. The same stands
for relations with the Czech Republic which
have bilateral and multilateral dimensions on the
Visegrád Group platform. Analysis of relations
within NATO is impossible without considera-
tion of bilateral relations between Poland and
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the United States. A particular place in Polish
security policies has been occupied by strategic
partnerships with Lithuania and Ukraine.
In addition to relationships with its neigh-
bors, a Central-European approach was strongly
emphasized. Poland joined Pentagonale in
1991, which was renamed Hexagonale and later
appears as the CEI. More important for Polish
Central European policy has been the coopera-
tion established by the Visegrád Declaration in
1991. Poland along with Czechoslovakia and
Hungary founded this informal political group
for the purpose of integration into western po-
litical, economic and security structures. The
Visegrád Triangle and later the Visegrád Group
or Visegrád Four (V4)  the formation was re-
named after the Czechoslovak divorce in 1993
 serves as a suitable diplomatic tool for the
promotion of Central-European and in broader
terms also the European aspirations of Poland.
Indeed, other partners in this project profit too
(Gajewski 2002, 298ff.).
The Polish attitude towards Visegrád coop-
eration is usually labeled as maximalist.
(Kolankiewicz 1994, 483f.). Due to its size and
preferred aspirations, Poland played a really
important role in the Central European region
in the transitional period. The commonly ac-
cepted opinion of Poland is that it is categorized
as a middle-sized country in European under-
standing, comparable for instance with Spain.
In addition to its size and population there is
significant evidence that the country is located
on the main line of relationships between the
EU, NATO, Ukraine and Russia.
Current Polish leadership potential is based
largely on these parameters and is less a result
of its economic power or technological devel-
opment. Indeed, the latter mentioned attributes
are improving now, but still show significant
shortfalls compared to larger European countries.
The Polish maximalist approach means that
country is well exercised in Central-European
co-operation for maximizing its fundamental
national interests. In the first place Poland is
determined to preserve its sovereignty and se-
curity. Security is perceived as a basic condi-
tion for prospective economic and civilization
development. In particular insurance terms,
hard security guarantees means membership
in NATO and soft security guarantees means
membership in the EU.
Poland has gained a dominant position in
Central Europe in a natural way thanks to its
geographical size. Participation in Central Eu-
ropean projects offered the proper opportunity
to support stability inside the transitional region.
So, the leading role of Poland can be especially
well demonstrated in the field of Central-Euro-
pean security issues. Although all the V4 coun-
tries intended to join the North-Atlantic Alli-
ance for security purposes, the decision of en-
largement had to be adopted within the existing
NATO member states.
Political evolution in the first half of the
1990s clearly showed that two conditions for
NATO enlargement had to be fulfilled. First of
all there must be at least one significant sup-
porter of enlargement within NATO. Secondly,
the process of enlargement has to be accompa-
nied by a visibly enlarged zone of stability.
Substantive steps from the side of NATO
emerged after Bill Clintons administration de-
cided to promote the widely understood strat-
egy of enlargement areas of liberal democra-
cies and free markets. In the fall of 1993 a new
strategy of enlargement was formulated which
replaced the strategy of containment (Lake
1993).
The most visible point of the new strategy
was NATO enlargement. During the process of
taking countries from Central Europe into
NATO, the administration could demonstrate
Americas security commitment towards the old
Continent. From the other side, the success of
the project depended among other factors on full
participation of candidate states in each stage
of enlargement. Without the aspirants coopera-
tion the goal was unachievable (Goldgeier 1999,
9 and 52f.).
In this respect an important event was the
presentation of the PfP in January 1994 in Brus-
sels and later that month in Prague. When
Clinton arrived in Prague at the summit with
V4 presidents there was a clear intention to per-
suade them to accept PfP as a first step to NATO.
But the American delegation had to hear seri-
ous reservations and many concerns about the
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adequacy of the program. There was no unquali-
fied willingness to take part in PfP because some
Central Europeans did not perceive PfP as
enough of a guarantee of full membership in
NATO in the foreseeable future (Asmus 2002,
54ff.; Goldgeier 1999, 53).
The US-administration had a special attitude
towards Poland. From the geopolitical point of
view, and with consideration of enlargement ef-
fectiveness, Poland stayed ahead of the group.
There were two earlier mentioned reasons. First,
Poland has expressed the most active position
among candidate states. And second, without
Polands involvement in the enlargement the
premise of stabilization of the area would make
the project a de facto failure (Asmus 2002, 62 f.).
After the Alliances enlargement in March
1999 the Organization had something which
could be described as a Central-European ex-
perience. Joining NATO, Poland was objec-
tively  in comparison to existing members 
militarily weak, but with a vital interest in keep-
ing NATO as a functioning security structure.
As a consequence, it was in Polands interest to
oppose changing NATO from a strong military
organization to a formal political structure with-
out a clear role.
The high level of Polish-American bilateral
relations has also had an impact on Polish Eu-
ropean policy and not only in its Central-Euro-
pean framework. Signs of this emerged just af-
ter Polands entry to the EU.
11th September 2001 brought additional im-
pulses for Polish-American relations. NATO, as
a whole, expressed support for the USA. At the
same time an unusual situation opened space
for Poland (and others) to intensify bilateral re-
lations with the U.S. President Bushs declara-
tion on war against international terrorism also
meant that Poland became part of a global se-
curity environment and it happened in a very
physical manner (Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003).
But collaterally, Polish-American relations have
steadily improved and the traditionally strong
linkage between the U.S. and its European al-
lies (Germany) has eroded. On the one hand it
has strengthened the Polish position. On the
other hand, risks have appeared concerning the
reduction of American presence in Europe, and
it is in direct contrast to the long-term security
strategy of Poland. Demand for a constant
American presence in Europe has been an inte-
gral part of each stage of Polish foreign policy
since the 1990s. It was not different on the eve
of the invasion of Iraq (Cimoszewicz 2003).
The Pentagons plans for new dislocated
American units around the world inspired Po-
land to offer its own territory for the next mis-
sion in Europe. The possibility that some of the
American troops from Germany could be moved
to Poland was also considered by experts dur-
ing a meeting between the U.S. and Polish rep-
resentatives in Warsaw in December 2003. Un-
til now, there is no positive answer to the Polish
invitations by the Americans.
The new Polish government created after
parliamentary elections in September 2005
keeps Polish-American relations high on the
agenda, especially with regard to security issues.
The current Minister of Defense Radoslaw
Sikorski is a well-known pro-Atlanticist and he
spent a long time in Great Britain and the United
States. The same ideological and political roots
of President Lech Kaczynski, who has taken
office after elections in October 2005, and the
ruling political party Law and Justice enable
us to assume that no differences between gov-
ernment and President will emerge in this re-
spect.
4. 1. Poland in an enlarged Europe
The core of Polish foreign policy interests
lies in Europe, but Poland only gained the op-
portunity to directly shape the most important
European organization, the EU, recently. How
can it be that the new-comer has created so
much excitement in such a short time? The
gradual building of this position within the Un-
ion should be recognized as an extension of the
previous Polish performance in NATO. Despite
the non-existence of causal relations between
membership status in the EU and NATO it is
possible to find certain trends in Polish foreign
policy from the recent past.
The EU is the primary source of future Polish
growth and development in economic, social,
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and cultural terms. But this statement is not in
full correlation with the Polish projection of a
security area. A range of reservations on this
point are emerging and there is also good rea-
son for the Poles distance towards concepts of
a future role of the EU regarding security ar-
eas. Directly speaking, in comparison with
NATO the EU is not a full-valued security al-
ternative and this fact is projected into basic
governmental documents too. The former Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz
Cimoszewicz expressed the position in his par-
liamentary expose in January 2004 as follows:
The logic of European integration makes co-
operation in the framework of security and
defense unavoidable. The Union, as a global
actor, must have at its disposal an appropriate
set of instruments, including military ones. Po-
land will join in all undertakings and forms of
cooperation that will not weaken the North At-
lantic Alliance and duplicate its functions
(Cimoszewicz 2004).
But with a certain degree of caution towards
the EU as a security guarantor there is connected
also a sense for realism in foreign policy. In prac-
tical terms it looks like Poland is not perfectly
situated for a leadership position in this case,
but is understandably participant in projects of
common security policy of the EU. And this
approach is in Polands own interest. Simulta-
neously it is evident that projection of particu-
lar Polish influence on development in the EU
framework is limited by the existing capacity
of Poland.
Some limits, resulting among others from
the economic power of Poland, which as a coun-
try tries to compensate by increased activities
on the political level. Amongst factors used by
Warsaw in its European policy, prime posi-
tion is held by its close relationship with the U.S.
The speech given by Minister Cimoszewicz in
January 2004 serves as a good example: Polish-
American relations have recently attained un-
precedented stature. One of the reasons for this
has been the Polish position during the Iraqi
crisis. This new quality in our relations has had
positive political consequences. It is a source of
our enhanced prestige, also among our Euro-
pean partners (Cimoszewicz 2004).
New Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam D.
Rotfeld described Polish interests in a similar
way in his annual parliamentary speech a year
later. The prestige of Poland in Washington is
today higher than at any time in the past. ... That
prestige has gained in significance since our
entry into the European Union. Our relations
with the United States are important primarily
because only America is in a position to extend
security guarantees to Poland  in their most
credible version. But Minister Rotfeld realisti-
cally added: We, in Poland, are aware that our
close  even privileged  relations with the
United States are not an alternative to our en-
gagement in European integration. ... Our com-
mitment to improving the transatlantic relations
will not be credible unless it is coupled with an
equally strong commitment to the development
of European cooperation (Rotfeld 2005).
As was mentioned above, Poland has made
efforts to be in the leading position in the Cen-
tral European region and this approach has simi-
larly been used with regard to the EU. Polish
diplomacy was always among the most active
and made a lot of attempts to participate in vari-
ous projects, many of them promoted by them-
selves too. Poland has the intention of being
perceived as a catalyst country, a country
which not only participates in important inter-
national processes but which is also their initia-
tive part and creator of the direction of its de-
velopment (Dančák 2004, 16ff.).
It shows clearly Polish policy towards the
EU and could be documented by another pas-
sage from Minister Cimoszewiczs expose on
the state of Polish foreign policy:
Our primary objective in the framework of the Un-
ions common foreign policy will consist of strength-
ening and invigorating EU cooperation with its
neighbors, in particular the Eastern ones, through
the establishment of the Eastern Dimension of the
EU policy. The relevant proposals that we have put
forward over the last few months have animated the
Unions debates on the subject. We will continue
our involvement in the work on the EU initiative A
Wider Europe  A New Neighborhood (Cimos-
zewicz 2004)
The same tone echoed in the next year pres-
entation when Minister Rotfeld (2005) stated:
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(A)s a member of the NATO and EU we shall seek
a new opening in the relations of the whole West
with Ukraine. ...In particular, we shall seek to it that
the European Union raises its relations with Ukraine
to the level of Strategic Partnership and opens the
prospect of integration, while advocating NATO
offer of a Membership Action Program.
4.2. The legitimacy of Polish leadership
ambitions
Polish foreign policy has showed a really
strong tendency towards a leadership position
and this tendency has been apparent since the
start of the transformation in 1989. We do not
find the same approach by other Visegrád Group
countries. Poland has played an active role in
international relations at various levels and
within differently wide forums. This attitude has
enabled Poland to promote its own national in-
terests not only in a Central European frame-
work, but also in a broader European context.
From the legitimacy point of view there is
no dispute about the key Polish role in the very
beginning of political reforms in Central Europe.
The Polish example served as one of the possi-
ble ways of dealing with communist regimes in
certain areas and the willingness of other na-
tions to follow this example was evident.
We are very close to making a similar claim
about the security issue and leading role of Po-
land with regards to NATOs enlargement. The
concept of enlargement was designed for the
whole Visegrád Group, but without Polands
involvement in it, the enlargement probably
wouldnt have fulfilled its essential purpose.
If a country wants to keep its position at the
top, the nature of the international environment
calls for a necessity to be ever active. The strug-
gle for leadership is constant and requires per-
manent readiness. Polish foreign policy is cre-
ated with respect to this and it is a long-term
trend.
Of course, from time to time and in some
situations, leadership policy clashes with oth-
ers because the game is played between actors
with different national interests. It is an inher-
ent dimension of international relations.
In the Polish case (but not only) tensions
were highly evident around the Iraqi crisis which
concurred with the final stage of Polish prepa-
ration to join the EU. These tensions followed
from disputes about Euro-Atlantic relations and
the position of particular European states to-
wards American foreign policy. Poland decided
to follow the U.S. direction which brought War-
saw some advantages. But, taking a long-term
perspective, it is difficult to assume the real
impact of this policy on the Polish position on
the European framework.
5. Conclusion
Due to several factors the potential leader-
ship ambitions of two Central European coun-
tries  Poland and Austria  remain unfulfilled.
First, both of the discussed countries have not
been ready to take on a leading role during the
last fifteen years. Second, they are lacking some
capacities (Austria in terms of military capaci-
ties, Poland in its level of economic develop-
ment) necessary for successful leadership posi-
tions in all analyzed dimensions of this concept.
Third, acceptance from other Central European
countries is limited due to the first two limits
and, of course, also due to individualist (and,
sometimes even solipsistic) strategies of some
neighboring countries (the best example here is
the Czech one) and/or due to the existence of
stronger centers of gravitation (Germany, USA).
Austria has the economic potential to play
the role of the leader but only limited political
power given its poor military potential. Poland
has only military potential but its diplomatic
possibilities are limited (although by different
reasons) and its economic potential is not suffi-
ciently developed for a regional leader.
Austrian ambitions to play such a role are at
best ambivalent. On the contrary, Poland is try-
ing openly to achieve a leading position in Cen-
tral Europe which could be demonstrated by
Polish policy within the Visegrád mechanism.
Poland is striving for the position of sub-regional
power in foreign and security policy terms. Po-
land doesnt try to play a leadership role in eco-
nomic sphere. Regional acceptance of Polish
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leadership ambitions is limited by the strong
Polish affiliation to US policies and divergent
position of Central European countries concern-
ing many issues of European integration. Aus-
trian acceptance is limited mainly because of
controversial issues in bilateral relations to par-
ticular countries in the region.
NOTES
1 The paper has been elaborated in the framework of
the Czech Science Foundation (GA CR) research
project Trans-Atlantic Relations and Foreign Policy
of Central European Countries (Code No. 407/06/
P444).
2  Realistic approach has led us not to take into ac-
count other aspects of regional cooperation such as
paradiplomacy of sub-state units and actors
(Soldatos 1990).
3  Although Austria has to face strong economic com-
petition of Germany in Central European region.
German importance in Central European foreign
trade could be illustrated even on Austrian exam-
ple. Germany is the most important Austrian for-
eign partner both in trade with commodities (31,9%
of total export and 40,8% of total import in 2003)
and the services (39,3% of total export and 36,5%
of total import in 2003). Central European coun-
tries are less important in trade with commodities
than Italy, USA, Switzerland, France, or the UK.
Hungary took the 7th position in 2003 (4% export;
3,2% import) followed by the Czech Republic (3,1%
export; 3,3% import). Slovenia is on the 11th posi-
tion, Poland on the 12th, and Slovakia on the 13th
(import) and the 14th (export). If we consider serv-
ices, Hungary is placed on the 9th place (2,5% ex-
port; 2,0% import), followed by Poland (2% export;
1,4% import) and the Czech Republic (1,5% export;
1,6% import). Slovenia and Slovakia occupy the 13th
and the 14th positions (cf. BMWA 2004: 175, 183
f.).
4  The activities of the Austrian-Czech Working Group
on radiation protection have lead to important im-
proving of regional cooperation in this field. An in-
formal system of cooperation was agreed among
Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary,
Slovakia, and Slovenia at a symposium in Salzburg
in 2003. Austrian-Slovenian discussions related to
the problem of Slovenian-Croatian nuclear power
plant Krko also lead to positive conclusions and an
expansion of mutual information and cooperation
(Ferrero-Waldner 2001).
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